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Introduction 
At the end of January 2003, the official period of consultation ended on the U.K. Home 
Secretary’s proposals for an entitlement card for all legal residents in Great Britain and 
Northern Ireland. What is proposed is not unreasonably regarded an identity card in all but 
name. In essence, the scheme is for a smart card, which it would be compulsory for all U.K. 
residents to possess. Although they would not be strictly legally required to carry it at all 
times, in practice it would probably be difficult to leave home without it. Behind the scheme 
would be a central population register containing a wide range of personal information. The 
governments hope is that it would help to combat identity fraud, although they have carefully 
avoided suggesting that it would help in combating crime generally, or even social security 
fraud, let alone terrorism. 
The government’s consultation paper claimed that the scheme would be compliant with the 
letter and spirit of data protection legislation. This two-part article is concerned with the 
question of how far both limbs of that claim are true. The article reviews in turn each of the 
major areas of concern around the application of the data protection principles Article 8s 
necessity test, fair processing, purposes, function creep, excess, accuracy, disclosures and 
security. 
The proposals were set out in Entitlement cards and identity fraud: a consultation paper 
(Secretary of State for the Home Department, 2002), referred to from now as ECIF; I shall 
also refer to the entitlement card as EnC for short (EC would have been more logical, but its 
common use to mean the European Community would have made it confusing). 
One matter of principle must be established at the outset. It is no part of the general 
provisions of British or European data protection law that it would rule out in principle any 
kind of identity card or entitlement card scheme. The fact that so many European Union 
countries have operated identity card schemes successfully, and without challenge for many 
years, suggests that it is rather unlikely that all such schemes would in principle or in any 
straightforward or automatic way fall foul of the European data protection law. Indeed, many 
of those countries have national data protection laws that are in some respects stricter than 
does the United Kingdom. However, it does not follow that any identity or entitlement card 
scheme would be compatible with British and European data protection law. The only 
question is whether this particular scheme, as proposed by the Home Secretary, is compliant. 
If as this article argues it is not, then in principle there is no reason why the government could 
not produce a revised scheme that would be compliant. 
Those who regard any such scheme as violations of liberty, or of a wider or deeper 
conception of privacy than that which is expressed in European data protection law, and those 
who distrust all public administration and believe that all data collections as unacceptably 
intrusive will not be satisfied with the argument of this article, and I would not expect them to 
be. However, it is important to work with the principles as they are presently expressed. 
Article 8: the Necessity Test 
While the processing of data in the central register would be deemed technically necessary in 
the Data Protection Act sense for the fulfilment of a statutory duty put in the legislation to 
administer an EnC scheme, this does raise the wider consideration of whether the processing 
involved is really necessary to administer the public and commercial public services that will 
be the major users of the card and the central register. It is this substantive test of necessity 
that Article 8 of the Human Rights Act raises for any legislation or scheme that would 
interfere with privacy, as the proposed creation of the population register and the proposed 
powers of data sharing would. Article 8 reads as follows: 
Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his 
correspondence. 
There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such 
as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of 
national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention 
of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights 
and freedoms of others. [emphasis added] 
The fact that the United Kingdom has conducted its affairs under roughly its present 
constitutional order and system of public services for many decades without a national 
population register suggests that the EnC scheme cannot be necessary, in general, even for 
the purposes of identifying U.K. residents or for administering the control of entitlement to 
public services (which would presumably be part of the prevention of crime and perhaps of 
economic well-being). Necessity in this sense implies some fairly serious failing in the 
absence of the measure. For example, it is not the case that, for lack of a scheme of this kind 
to limit services only to those legally resident in the country or with a certain employment 
status, there is a crisis of public expenditure requiring major cuts in entitlements to NHS care 
or to means-tested benefits. In practice, these services have found ways over many years of 
defining the information they require for the demonstration of identity and entitlement and 
for the detection of fraud that have worked reasonably well, and that have been steadily 
augmented in recent years with new powers. Moreover, to the extent that there are problems 
of benefit fraud, they are not generally ones of identity fraud or indeed problems which the 
EnC might make a very large contribution to solving. 
The figure of 1.3bn as annual value for identity fraud in the United Kingdom, out of a 13.8bn 
estimated value of fraud in total, cannot really be used to demonstrate a failure on the scale 
required to meet a necessity test, precisely for the reason that the government cannot 
demonstrate that the EnC scheme will reduce identity fraud to any specifiable level in a 
sustainable way over time, given the probability that the EnC will itself be counterfeited and 
sometimes successfully applied for illicitly. It would be hard to say that as a reasonably 
successful developed economy, the United Kingdom exhibits the kind of extensive failure in 
economic life or public services that only an EnC scheme could correct. 
Certainly, human rights legislation would not be interpreted in such a way that it ruled out 
any innovations that involved data processing save in the event of major crisis. That would be 
absurd. The European courts have ruled that states have some latitude in defining what is 
necessary. However, the fact that the Article uses the term, necessary rather that say 
convenient or beneficial or worthwhile as the test for acceptability is important. If the 
government is to make the substantive case for the scheme, then at the very least it must be 
shown that the problem to which it is presented as the solution is sufficiently great that the 
costs and risks, including the privacy risks, of the scheme, are ones that are worth paying. 
Fair Processing 
ECIF only discusses the fair processing rule in relation to the possibility of private sector 
organisations using or abusing the unique identifier without good reason in ways that are not 
permitted by the primary legislation (see section 6.5). However, there are other fair 
processing issues to be considered. 
The main questions about fair processing do not arise in connection with the compatibility of 
the EnC scheme in principle as it might be set out in primary legislation, but rather in relation 
to risks of particular abuses that might be carried out by particular officials who demand the 
production of cards and who access data on the central register. 
If a particular group in the population were to find that its members were subject 
systematically to more frequent demands for production of the card and identity checking 
which involves accessing and processing the data on the central register, this might not only 
be harassment in civil law, but could also be found to be unfair processing of the information 
accessible through the card. For unnecessary requests for identification data, and accessing 
those data from the central register, could well, in these circumstances, be unfair to the 
individual data subject. The Commissioner has said that the fair processing principle is to be 
considered in the light of the consequences of processing for the interests of the data subject. 
Discriminatory repetitious access to identification data could in particular threaten the 
interests of ethnic minority data subjects. 
It is an understandable concern that a card which is explained to the public and to officials 
administering public services as one that is to be used, among other things, to combat illegal 
immigration and illegal working will raise concerns among some ethnic minority groups that 
they may be asked to produce their card more frequently than, for example, people from the 
white, primarily Anglophone majority. Discriminatory practice in demanding production of 
identity or of other documentation, such as evidence of legal title to a car one is driving, has 
been criticised over many years in a number of reports on police practice, going back at least 
far as the Scarman report into the 1981 riots in Brixton. Traditionally, such requests have 
been for paper documents, and have not involved the processing of data online. When 
officials repeatedly and unnecessarily demand the production of a smart card, insert it into a 
reader device and access identification data from the central register, this will amount to 
processing, and so will fall within the data protection principle. 
The government may have two replies to this concern. The first is that no new additional 
police powers are being proposed to demand production of the card for identification over 
and above those which police officers already have. The second is that the card should 
provide a swifter and more efficient means by which to process and so dismiss any 
unfounded suspicions. 
However, these points do not deal with the matter entirely, nor do they address the fair 
processing implications. Firstly, as ECIF notes (see section 2.16), police officers are not 
without powers, in effect, to demand identification: even minor offences become arrestable if 
identity cannot be ascertained or if there is suspicion that a name and address given are not 
genuine. More importantly and secondly, the EnC will be demanded by a great many more 
public servants, and indeed staff in private organisations working under contract to public 
authorities to provide services, than just police officers. One cannot rule out the possibility of 
systematic discrimination in the frequency with which cards are demanded and the 
information on the central register is read, checked with other documents the person may 
carry, and cross-checked with service-specific databases, and it will be important to ensure 
that there are safeguards in place. 
At the very least, for example, data subjects could be given a receipt on each occasion that 
their card is taken and their data are read. This might either be in a printed form from a ticket 
printer attached to a card reader device, or it might be sent to them automatically by whatever 
means they agree to, when they make their application for the card. This would enable the 
creation of an audit trail with which data subjects whose data were being processed 
excessively could use to seek redress. (It is surprising, for example, that ECIF is silent on the 
issue of the need for an audit trail of occasions on which data were accessed, particularly in 
the light of the fact that the consultation paper discusses the possible health care uses. For the 
current Department of Health consultation paper on privacy in electronic health records does 
and rightly propose to provide for just such an audit trail in all new NHS systems: see NHS 
Information Authority, 2002, p.6) Otherwise, there could be cases brought before the 
Information Commissioner under the fair processing principle. 
More generally, these are all matters that ought to be the subject of quite detailed guidance in 
a Code of Practice for public servants who may have occasion to ask for identification and to 
demand production of cards. Such a code should specify the occasions on which production 
of a card may be demanded, ways of minimising unnecessary repetition in requests, 
information to be provided to a citizen when their card is processed, etc., and should also 
provide for means of administrative redress by individuals aggrieved by violations of the 
code. 
Purposes 
The second data protection principle restricts processing to that which is compatible with the 
specified and lawful purposes. 
ECIF states that the purposes for the EnC scheme will be (see section 6.3) 
• to provide people who are lawfully resident in the United Kingdom with a means of 
confirming their identity to a high degree of assurance; 
• to establish for official purposes a persons identity so that there is one definitive record of 
an identity which all departments can use if they wish; 
• to help people gain entitlement to products and services provided by both the public and 
private sectors; 
• to help public and private sector organisations to validate a persons identity, entitlement to 
products and services and eligibility to work in the United Kingdom. 
(As it is written, the third purpose could not be achieved, for the card scheme does not itself 
add any new entitlements: any gain could only be in the ease with which a person might use 
the administrative processes required to secure their existing entitlements.) 
This list of proposed purposes is extremely broad, and this breadth is in itself a matter of 
concern in data protection law. The expansion of the definition of purposes can be a way in 
which to evade the spirit and indeed sometimes the letter of the Act. 
These proposed purposes are remarkable at the very least in that they are independent of any 
particular service, or of any field of service, or type of substantive benefit in the interests of 
the data subjects. Indeed, on the contrary, the purposes that the Home Secretary proposes are 
generic and procedural. 
There are good reasons for thinking that these purposes are too broad. It would not normally 
be considered an acceptable purpose in data protection law that processing should be for the 
prevention and detection of crime or fraud quite generally. A set of purposes of this kind 
which in effect specify a purpose of providing a means for checking for the possibility of 
identity fraud is not much narrower than that, and should be questioned for the same reasons. 
The point of the requirement in data protection law for specified purposes is to give citizens 
as data subjects and data protection regulators a clear understanding of the intended 
boundaries around uses, disclosures and around what information would count as relevant, 
and therefore to prevent function creep or the steady inflation in the range of uses. The 
underlying argument is that citizens cannot be expected to trust in governments and in public 
services that do not adequately define and delimit the purposes for which citizens personal 
information will be used. The four clauses listed in paragraph 6.3 of ECIF do not do this, for 
they do not exclude any categories of information as clearly irrelevant and excessive for 
purpose, nor do they clearly exclude any categories of inferences from data or any types or 
destinations of disclosures as improper. For a scheme of the political salience and sensitivity 
of this one, the government would be wise to provide a much more detailed, tightly delimited 
set of purposes defined around categories of public and commercial services and to specify 
just what will count as adequate evidence of entitlement for each of them, and for just which 
of those services, named identification is really necessary and why, and to spell out clearly 
just what benefits citizens can expect in each service from being able to or required to use the 
card. 
The fact that the scheme is built upon the passport and driving licence systems (together with 
the new central register for third category of EnCs) is not of much help here, because in effect 
what ECIF is proposing is a very large extension indeed in the specified purposes for which 
passport and driving licence data may be processed. 
Function Creep 
Function creep is the term usually used to describe the tendency over time of instruments or 
initiatives involving data processing initially for one specified purpose to come to be used for 
other purposes. This is of course a violation of the second or finality principle of data 
protection, but function creep does occur. In general, the more broadly framed the specified 
purposes of any instrument or activity of data processing, the greater risk of function creep, 
because broad purposes make it difficult for anyone to determine clearly what, if anything, 
might lie beyond their scope. The EnC proposal is quite specifically designed to be open-
ended in the list of services that might use it as the main or principal or even sole means of 
identification for applicants. Indeed, the way in which the purposes are set out in paragraph 
6.3 provides very little guidance on what would be excluded. 
ECIF envisages the extension of the central register into the control of entries into the 
electoral register. Since the question of whether a person is lawfully resident in the United 
Kingdom is a relevant consideration in applications for cash benefits, for tax exemptions and 
now for certain kinds of health care, it is clear that one of the implicit purposes of the scheme 
is to enable those who are expected by government to act as gatekeepers for services to patrol 
more effectively for compliance with the rules by which services are rationed. Although this 
is nowhere stated in ECIF, and certainly the consultation paper provides nothing so tasteless 
as estimates of the sums that might be saved to the taxpayer through excluding persons who 
are not lawful residents from public services (the savings identified are all to do with 
substitutions for current procedures, not to do with substantive savings on service 
expenditure), it is clear that this must be a consequence of the scheme. Does this represent a 
logical corollary of the purpose of identification for entitlement to public services, or does it 
represent function creep? The way in which the purposes are specified makes it very difficult 
to know. 
Indeed, where the EnC becomes not just one or even a main but the sole means of 
identification, is it then fulfilling its purpose, or has it gone beyond it? Again, it is hard to be 
sure, but the question might well be litigated. 
The question of function creep becomes even more difficult when questions of data matching 
and data sharing are considered. Some data sharing and matching activities are inherent in the 
nature of the proposed scheme. These occur at the point of application, at the point of 
voluntary presentation of the card in the use of services, and in the course of activities of 
public officials who may demand the card under powers to sanction citizens found to have 
abused services or committed crimes, or may access the central register in the course of their 
investigations without the presentation of a card. The four limbs of the purpose statement at 
6.3 are not, even taken together, sufficiently precisely framed to enable anyone to determine 
just which practices of data matching and data sharing might represent fair processing in the 
light of these purposes, and which might represent disclosures in violation of the principles of 
the 1998 Act. 
For example, ECIF envisages that a multi-functional smartcard might be issued as an EnC 
which would include space for a directory that would support a season ticket for a transport 
service: the data on transport usage and payment would not be held on the central population 
register for the EnC, but there would be an ability to link between the two, not least because 
of the need to reconstruct the whole card in the case of loss of theft (see section 6.11). The 
travel company would only be able to access the central EnC register subject to conditions set 
by the government on the use of the general identifier. However, exactly what conditions the 
government would impose are not spelled out in ECIF, and so it is not yet fully demonstrated 
that they will fully control risks of function creep. Transport companies have a variety of 
marketing reasons for wanting to acquire more information about their customers and 
passengers. Marketing would surely be a distinct purpose for the scheme, and it would be a 
purpose which would have to be declared for the central register and not only for the travel 
companies: however ECIFs stated list of purposes do not cover this, even though the 
consultation paper does acknowledge this use. 
Consider the question of the use of the data from the central register in the course of criminal 
investigations. In principle, a police officer might access the central register, even without 
demanding the card from an individual and inserting it into a reader device, if they have other 
identifying data and online access to the central register from a computer. In the course of the 
investigation, for example, the police officer might come to consider that it would be useful 
to see whether a person’s entry on that central register shows them to have a particular 
employment status, or they might find it useful to discover other identifiers such as national 
insurance number or driver number or nationality or indeed to obtain the digitised 
photograph. Is this something that is within the second of the four purposes, as being a 
definitive identity that departments can use if they wish? Or within the first half of the fourth 
that is, helping organisations to validate an individual’s identity? Perhaps it is. Yet the 
statement of purposes says nothing about assisting the criminal investigations as a purpose: it 
would be clearer if it did. However, it would not clarify anything were the government to try 
to put in a purpose for the scheme that allowed the data on the central register to be used in 
any manner a public servant considered conducive to the prevention or detection of crime, 
fraud or abuse. In order to be adequately specified, and to prevent function creep, purposes 
must be much more tightly delimited. 
More generally, in answers to questions at public meeting on December 11, 2002 at the 
London School of Economics on the proposal, Lord Falconer of Thoroton, Home Office 
minister, said that function creep will be controlled by the requirement to obtain additional 
primary legislation for any additional functions. In a technical sense, as a statement of the 
principle, of course, this is true. However, this is not a satisfactory answer to the concern, for 
unfortunately, the fact that the purposes are so widely defined means that it will not always 
be clear just when additional primary legislation would be needed and when it would not. 
Excess 
The third data protection principle requires that personal data shall be adequate, relevant and 
not excessive in relation to the purposes for which they are processed. This is one of the most 
important substantive principles, and the issue of what information might be is excessive for 
purpose is especially critical in the case of databases such as the proposed central population 
register for the EnC system, which are designed to interface with many other databases and 
thus are expected to provide a wide variety of disclosures. 
The first problem in establishing just whether and how far the EnC system might meet the 
standard set in this principle is that ECIF provides a statement of the purposes of the scheme 
that is very broad indeed. The purpose statement is crafted in procedural terms. Because no 
particular services with their particular entitlement rules are identified, ECIF cannot proceed 
to use these to define the information requirements for each, which would result in a well-
designed system of information requirements for each principal type of event accessing the 
central register. It is therefore very difficult to determine just what is excessive for the 
purposes. 
ECIF admits that the EnC scheme will violate the third data protection principle, but claims 
that the benefits of the scheme will outweigh the costs and the risks. Paragraph 6.10 reads as 
follows: 
If they were used as entitlement cards, both the photocard driving licence and to a lesser 
extent the passport card would therefore show more information than was strictly required for 
their individual purposes. This is almost unavoidable in any scheme involving dual or multi-
use cards. The advantages in terms of the convenience to the cardholder of having one card to 
fulfil a number of purposes probably outweigh the disadvantages of displaying on a single 
card slightly more information than in strictly necessary for each individual entitlement. 
However, the question of information excess in the EnC scheme cannot be dismissed nearly 
so quickly. 
First, the issue does not arise solely in respect of the information displayed in plain text on 
the face of the card, but also in the case of the information stored in the chip or on the central 
register which is accessed by the card reader device. Dealing with this will require several 
things. First, the face of the card should contain as little information as possible. Secondly, 
the software with which card reader devices are managed must be so designed that it will 
limit the information that can be accessed both by the nature of the organisation holding the 
reader device and by the particular purpose of the enquiry for which the card was produced 
and read. Thirdly, there would have to be strict organisational protocols to ensure that each 
organisation only used reader devices configured for their particular legitimate interests and 
did not borrow devices from others, or trade them, or attempt to reconfigure their devices. 
For example, information about the cardholder’s employment status may be relevant for 
applications for certain cash benefits, but will not be relevant in many driving-related 
contexts or in proof-of-age contexts. Again, consider the issue of a person’s date of birth. The 
government proposes that the EnC might be used as an instrument for proof-of-age (3.23-
3.24). However, in order to show that a person has the right to enter a public house, or 
purchase tobacco or a pet, the publican or retailer do not need to know the persons date of 
birth: the information is excessive for the particular purpose of this transaction, which is a 
case of the general class of purposes (identification for entitlement) that the government 
would set out for the scheme as a whole. It is necessary only that the card should reveal to the 
card reader device the information that the holder is of age to enter or to purchase, not that it 
should reveal the particular or exact age of the holder. Again, for these purposes, nationality 
and employment status are generally irrelevant and excessive. Indeed, even the name is 
excessive. Therefore, the cardholders name should not automatically even appear displayed 
on the face of the card if one of the aims is to support simple proof-of-age. 
ECIF says very little about just how it will be ensured that information taken either from the 
card or from the central register will not be captured and stored in other databases after the 
particular transaction for identification using the card has been completed. Since much of the 
information in principle available through the card would be excessive for the purposes of 
many of the service transactions in the course of which it might be used, this is a major data 
protection concern. Capture and retention of information will be a very significant issue 
where the card is used in the private sector, not only for privacy reasons but also because it 
would represent a huge information subsidy at the taxpayer’s expense to commercial database 
builders. However, capture and retention will be an important issue, not least because of the 
technical imperatives to allow audit trails (a matter on which ECIF is rather oddly silent), and 
the technical impossibility of enforcing any legal rule prohibiting retention. 
The central problem about excessive information is the way in which the concept of identity 
is used in ECIF and indeed in much of the debate about identity and entitlement cards. From 
a data protection standpoint, identity is that irreducible minimum of information about an 
individual data subject that is strictly necessary for the purpose of the particular transaction or 
event to enable that transaction or event to be completed effectively and meaningfully with 
proper safeguards for data subjects and organisations using their data, but no more. That is, 
from a data protection standpoint, identity is contextual: for the necessary minimum of 
identifying information required for identification in the setting of passing through passport 
control, of satisfying a police officer of one’s authorisation to drive a car, of purchasing 
fireworks, and so on, will be significantly different. For example, in a setting where the 
crucial issue is proof-of-age, ones name and address is excessive. 
However, this is not at all how ECIF understands the concept of identity. Annex 4, paragraph 
20 sets out the Home Office conception. It defines identity as a vector of characteristics 
biometric characteristics, lifetime characteristics that are institutionally fixed such as date of 
birth, name and parents names, and variable or biographical characteristics associated with 
particular events in one’s life. Although the link is not spelled out in full, the information that 
has been selected to be proposed to be held on the central register seems to reflect an idea of 
a core set of these characteristics that can be assumed to be relevant, irrespective of context 
(see Annex 4, paragraphs 85-95). 
Beginning with this context-invariant conception of identity, an inability to comply with the 
third data protection principle follows fairly logically. 
The general claim that the gains in convenience will outweigh the risks is not one that can be 
made without a great deal more analysis of the risks that might arise from the disclosure and 
probably retention of at least some of the excessive information about individuals. 
Unfortunately, the open-ended nature of the scheme, the fact that an indefinite number of 
services might use it, makes it almost impossible to conduct such a risk assessment. 
May the benefits lawfully be balanced against the privacy risks in this way? It is far from 
clear that they may. The third principle is not drafted in such a way that it permits any 
balancing between convenience and excess or irrelevance. While gains in convenience might 
be legitimate interests of data controllers, the Data Protection Act only allows those interests 
to override privacy concerns where the processing is necessary to secure those legitimate 
interests. It would be very difficult to show that this is the case, for the benefits of the scheme 
cannot be established clearly (indeed, ECIF cannot credibly and does not promise any 
particular level of reduction even in identity fraud) and because there are many other ways in 
which greater convenience in securing entitlements to services might be achieved. 
The second part of this article, to be published in the April issue of World Data Protection 
Report, goes on to consider the issues of accuracy, disclosures of information from the 
central register and security. 
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